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PRIVATIZATION—THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY? 
CAROL M. ROSE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many governments around the world 
have adopted measures that are often described as “privatization.”  That label 
generally refers to governmentally sponsored efforts to move assets and 
economic decision-making away from the political arena and into the hands of 
individuals or private corporations.1  Some of these efforts have been part of 
the package of economic principles—the so-called “Washington Consensus”—
urged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since the early 
1990s, and as such they have drawn criticism on a number of grounds.2  
Influential proponents continue to advance privatization schemes over a great 
range of subjects, both at home and abroad.3 
Why have they done so?  The primary reasons are economic.  The old 
Soviet Union and its satellites dramatically illustrated the manner in which 
dirigiste, state-centered economies can lapse into wasteful decrepitude.4  
 
* Ashby Lohse Professor of Water and Natural Resource Law, University of Arizona, Rogers 
College of Law, and Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Emerita, Yale 
University.  For very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article I wish to thank the 
participants at the Yale Seminar in Latin America on Constitutional and Political Theory (SELA), 
the Conference on Property, Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurship, and the University of 
Arizona College of Law Faculty Enrichment Program.  For very able research assistance I would 
also like to thank Elizabeth Black, Pam Campos, and Hal Frampton. 
 1. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (8th ed. 2004). 
 2. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, A World of Passions: How to Think About Globalization Now, 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Summer 2004, at 1, 4 (describing the so-called “Washington 
Consensus,” including deregulation and privatization of government-owned enterprises along 
with trade liberalization).  The origin of the name “Washington Consensus” is John Williamson, 
What Washington Means By Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH 
HAS HAPPENED? 5, 5 (John Williamson ed., 1990). 
 3. Eric Sylvers, Strong Demand as Italy Sells Utility Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at 
W1 (describing privatization of Italian state energy utility and plans for privatization of state 
telecommunications entity and postal service); cf. Ryan Tyz, Energy Maquiladoras: Integrating 
the Electricity Markets of the United States and Mexico, 6 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63, 64–65 (2004) 
(arguing that energy production has been slower to privatize, though the process is beginning). 
 4. See Roger Barrett James, Information—The Key to Fair Privatization: British Successes 
and Russian Pitfalls, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 837, 851–57 (1998). 
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Drawing a lesson from those bad examples, privatizers have hoped to infuse 
their respective economic spheres with the efficiency, energy, and innovation 
that are thought to accompany decentralized individual initiatives.  
Nevertheless, over the last decade, critics have beaten the drums ever more 
loudly about the failings and lapses of privatization policies, particularly as 
represented by the Washington Consensus on international investment, and 
they have thus lent some intellectual support to the leaders of popular backlash, 
as well as to the political figures who wish to stage some kind of retreat.5  
Many of these critiques point to the political costs of privatizations—their 
adverse impact on local sovereignty,6 their short-changing of less-well-off 
citizens,7 and their stirring of intergroup domestic strife.8 
Privatization’s critics have encountered critics of their own,9 but they have 
managed to shift some attention away from the economic foundations of 
 
 5. See, e.g., Juan Forero, Latin America Fails To Deliver on Basic Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
22, 2005, at A1 (describing popular resistance to privatizations); Larry Rohter, With New Chief, 
Uruguay Veers Left, in a Latin Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at A3 (describing newly 
elected president’s promise to rein in privatization).  A leading critic has been JOSEPH STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18, 57–58, 73–74, 247–48 (2002) (criticizing the pace 
and insensitivity of Washington Consensus principles to specific needs, especially for poverty 
reduction).  Criticism also appears with respect to certain economic sectors.  See, e.g., MAUDE 
BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF THE 
WORLD’S WATER, at xii, 160–65 (2002) (criticizing Washington Consensus and international 
financial institutions’ pressure to privatize water systems).  Even American President George W. 
Bush, a great proponent of private ownership of previously governmentally operated systems 
such as retirement benefits, seems to notice the unpopularity of privatization.  See Robin Toner, 
It’s ‘Private’ vs. ‘Personal’ in Debate Over Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A16 
(describing plan to privatize social security, though calling accounts “personal” instead of 
“private”). 
 6. Catherine H. Lee, Comment, To Thine Own Self Be True: IMF Conditionality and 
Erosion of Economic Sovereignty in the Asian Financial Crisis, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 875, 
903–04 (2003) (arguing that world financial organizations’ imposition of Washington Consensus 
infringes on national sovereignty); see also William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire: Notes 
on the Washington Consensus, HARPER’S MAG., May 2003, at 50 (same); STIGLITZ, supra note 5, 
at 247 (same). 
 7. See, e.g., Alhaji B.M. Marong, From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of 
International Legal Norms in Sustainable Development, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 33–34 
(2003) (arguing that neoliberal Washington Consensus standards ignore distributional and 
environmental welfare criteria). 
 8. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS 
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 6–7 (2003) (arguing that privatization policies 
ignore potential backlash against market-dominant minorities); see also Purdy, supra note 2, at 
23–24 (arguing that Washington Consensus ignores emotional issues). 
 9. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A Review of Globalization and Its Discontents, 35 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251, 254–56 (2003) (book review) (criticizing author Joseph Stiglitz for 
inconsistencies in his critique of international lending policies); Tom Ginsburg, Democracy, 
Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 310, 312 
(2004) (reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
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privatization, re-directing attention to the political aspects of privatization.  
Following that lead, this Article will focus primarily on the political 
intellectual rationales for privatization.  Indeed, the arguments for privatization 
have continually sounded a political note, though it may play a second or third 
fiddle in the Washington Consensus:10 somewhere behind the economic case 
for privatization is the companion idea that privatization promotes democracy. 
Recent privatization efforts, taken together with increasing political 
resistance to privatization, offer an opportunity to reassess this idea in the light 
of recent experience.  The Article will begin by setting out a fairly simplified 
classification of some different types of measures that are commonly 
considered “privatization.”  Following that, the Article will delve into several 
controversies surrounding such measures, and into the basic economic 
arguments that are supposed to support privatization even in the face of 
controversy.  It will then shift the focus to the political rationales for 
privatization. 
Of particular interest is the light that modern privatization efforts cast on 
the central political claim for privatization.  That claim is that private property 
and contract (as opposed to centrally organized economic direction) 
fundamentally advance the growth of democratic institutions.11  A variety of 
arguments purport to support this central claim—arguments that long predate 
modern privatization efforts and that have been remarkably persistent over 
time.  At least some aspects of modern privatization do indeed add to their 
weight.  Nevertheless, there are also weighty exceptions, suggesting that 
privatization alone cannot do all the work of democratization.  While in some 
respects, modern privatization initiatives indicate that individual economic 
rights—together with the larger economies that grow out of them—sometimes 
do help to foster accountable institutions, in other respects it is clear that these 
initiatives toward private ownership depend on a pre-existing accountable 
institutional infrastructure.  The basic argument of this Article is thus that the 
relationship of privatization and democratic governance cannot be seen simply 
as ancestor-to-successor, where the one (privatization) precedes the other 
(democratization).  At most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and 
democratization are siblings, co-existing in a mixed environment of mutual 
support, dependence, and occasional rivalry. 
II.  A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVATIZATIONS 
 
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003), arguing that evidence does not 
support its thesis of link between privatization and ethnic conflict). 
 10. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 8 (describing “promotion of democracy and human 
rights” as a concern, but one far behind economic motivations in the Washington Consensus). 
 11. Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 333–34 
(1996) [hereinafter Keystone Right]. 
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Very roughly, one can classify the last two decades’ privatization 
initiatives into four types of state-sponsored measures with respect to property, 
which I will call “recognition,” “deregulation,” “divestment,” and 
“enablement.” 
First, recognition measures are those that provide the administrative means 
to regularize private property ownership, particularly by formalizing ownership 
rights in persons who previously enjoyed only informal claims.  This is a fairly 
low-key form of privatization, though it too can be controversial.  One major 
type of recognition measure is the reform of titling procedures.  This reform 
seems quite pedestrian at first glance, but it can have large implications for 
security of title, and security of title in turn can have large implications for the 
lives of property owners.12  The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in 
particular has brought these titling reform measures into the public eye, 
arguing that developing countries can very much enhance their wealth by 
converting informal land titles—claims held in squatter communities in 
particular—into formal ones.13  De Soto stresses that with formal title to their 
property, newly secured owners can use their property as collateral to borrow 
money and finance small businesses.14  Other scholars point out that with 
formal title, an owner can enforce her claims through the police, the courts, 
and other governmental institutions, and as a consequence she need not spend 
so much effort on guarding her property in person, nor need she rely so heavily 
on neighborhood bosses to enforce her claims.15  Once freed from those 
burdens, she might be able to take a job at some distance from her home, 
knowing that her property is safe from a forceful takeover by others.16  Finally, 
clearer titles simply loosen up the market for property, allowing resources to 
flow into the hands of those who are willing to pay most for them.  For these 
reasons and others, Peru, India, and Thailand, among a number of other 
countries, are currently making major efforts to simplify the registration of 
land titles.17 
 
 12. See KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 36–
50 (2003), http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=477769&pagePK=641680 
92&piPK=64168088&theSitePK=477757 (World Bank report describing importance of land 
security, including titling). 
 13. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
 14. See id. at 51, 57–58. 
 15. See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru 35–
36 (Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=347240). 
 16. See, e.g., id. 
 17. See Joanna Slater, India’s Land Market Impedes Growth, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at 
B7C (concerning land registration reforms in India and other Asian countries); Field, supra note 
15. 
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Second is deregulation, that is, relaxing governmental control over 
entrepreneurial activities.  India, again, is considering abandoning its elaborate 
constraints on the size of individual landholdings;18 meanwhile Germany 
debates the welter of labor regulations that may protect currently employed 
workers but that may also impede businesses’ ability to create new jobs.19  The 
general idea of deregulation is to shed governmental intrusions that simply 
protect certain groups at the expense of others, or that pursue ideological goals 
that no longer seem useful.  On those grounds, many countries carry 
regulations that would seem to be candidates.  Just to take the example of size 
limits on landholding: India is by no means alone in these regulations.  In order 
to protect small farmers, the United States until recently imposed sharp 
restrictions on the size of farms that received irrigation water from federally 
financed dams, but large-scale agricultural interests evaded these limits by 
entering into complicated leasing arrangements.20  In the end, the constraints 
seemed to do no one any good because they were so widely evaded, and 
because they complicated market transactions for no good reason.21  A 
different kind of protectionist regulation is residential rent control, which can 
keep current tenants’ rents low, but which may make it difficult for outsiders to 
find a place to rent, since owners may balk at opening up more property at 
fixed rents.22 
Favoritism and inefficiency are nothing new in regulatory regimes, of 
course; Adam Smith complained about these issues over two hundred years 
ago.23  Nevertheless, most commentators acknowledge that certain types of 
regulatory controls may be necessary to safeguard public health and safety, 
along with the environment, matters that are often underprotected by the 
market transactions of private owners.24  The trick, of course, is to figure out 
 
 18. Slater, supra note 17. 
 19. Carter Dougherty, Jobless Germans Face a New Round of Benefit Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2004, at W1 (describing cuts in formerly ample benefits). 
 20. See Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 
657, 660–63 (1989) (describing 1902 legislation restricting reclamation water delivery to 160-
acre farms and widespread evasion through leasing).  The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa–390zz-1), expanded the size limit 
for subsidized water to 960 acres, with owners being required to pay full price for larger acreage.  
Id. at 664–65. 
 21. See id. at 661. 
 22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 762–63, 767 (1988) (describing issues created by rent control statutes); cf. 
Peter D. Salins, Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 775 (1988) (noting that Epstein’s arguments to date have been impossible to test). 
 23. EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS 127–28 (2001) (describing Smith’s low 
opinion of merchants’ propensity to seek and get political favors). 
 24. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1998) (noting that theories of regulation derive from 
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which regulations are genuinely socially advantageous to overcome market 
failures, and which are merely protectionist or ideological.  For example, a few 
years ago the United States banned tuna fish imports when the fish had been 
caught without excluding dolphins from the nets.25  The United States claimed 
that this measure was an environmental protection.26  But Mexico brought a 
complaint under international trade agreements, claiming that these purported 
dolphin protections were merely protectionist measures to shield U.S. 
fishermen from Mexican competition.27  Mexico’s success in this claim did not 
close the issue, however, since many still believe that the tuna regulation was 
an important environmental measure and not merely an example of 
protectionism.28 
A third privatization initiative I will call divestiture, i.e., removing whole 
enterprises from governmental administration and placing them instead in the 
hands of private entrepreneurs.  These are probably the best-known kinds of 
“privatization” measures, and they can be very controversial.  Margaret 
Thatcher’s government in England led the way in the 1980’s, denationalizing 
all kinds of industries that had been brought into public ownership over the 
course of the twentieth century, particularly under Labour governments after 
the Second World War.29  A decade later, with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1989, Russia and Eastern Europe saw whole arrays of enterprises moving 
into private hands.30  Beginning at about the same time, at the urging of 
international financial institutions, a number of Latin American countries 
experimented with the privatization of several different industries, for example 
 
market failure).  Croley, however, faults the major theories of regulation for failing to account for 
the actual regulatory process.  Id. at 3–6. 
 25. Richard Skeen, Will the WTO Turn Green? Implications of Injecting Environmental 
Issues into the Multilateral Trading System, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 185–86 (2004). 
 26. Id. at 187. 
 27. For a brief account, see id. at 186–88 (describing the case, its outcome, and a follow-up 
case involving the Netherlands). 
 28. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 
66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 751–52, 783 (1993) (noting that some environmentalist groups were 
sufficiently alarmed to ask for reconsideration of trade agreements; Mexico and the United States 
defused political heat by making a subsequent agreement for dolphin protections). 
 29. For an extensive study of the theory and practice of the Thatcher-era deregulations, see 
JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988); see also 
id. at 139–40, 160–69 (for postwar era of nationalization and the radical shift to privatization after 
1979); James, supra note 4, at 837, 842–51 (narrating a short history of British privatization).  
James, supra note 4, at 837, 842–51. 
 30. See, e.g., James, supra note 4 at 857–69 (describing massive Russian privatizations in 
the early 1990s); John White, Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe, 13 INT’L L. 
PRACTICUM 19,  22–25 (2000) (giving a survey of privatizations in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary); TERRY COX & BOB MASON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN EAST 
CENTRAL EUROPE 101–04 (1999) (summarizing post-Soviet era economic restructuring in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). 
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telecommunications systems and municipal waterworks.31  Even China now 
has been quietly pondering measures that move agriculture at least partly out 
of state or commune control and into the hands of peasants.32 
Enablement refers to the governmental establishment and protection of 
property rights in resources that would otherwise not easily be turned into 
property at all.  Intellectual property rights—trademark, copyright, and 
patent—are a well-established example of governmentally enabled property 
rights.  These property rights owe their existence very largely to statutory law.  
They effectively privatize the uses of inventions and expressions that would 
otherwise be open to copying by the general public.  Intellectual property (IP) 
is not new; the protection of copyright in the English speaking world is 
commonly dated back to the Statute of Anne in 1710, and patent rights for 
inventors followed over the next century.33  In recent decades, however, IP has 
become particularly important, as global trade has whetted interest in the 
import and export of expressive materials and technology all over the world, 
and as new technologies have made it so much easier to copy the ideas of 
others.34  Indeed, IP in a sense signals how closely privatization is linked to 
globalization.  Questions about IP have become a major focus in debates over 
world trade, with more developed countries usually pressing for greater IP 
protection while less developed countries hold out for more relaxed rules.35 
 
 31. See Andrea L. Johnson, Preserving Privatization of Telecommunications in Five 
Emerging Markets: Germany, Egypt, South Korea, Argentina and Mexico, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 311 (2002) (concerning telecommunications in Latin American countries, among others); 
Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational Corporations 
and the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1663, 1747–74 (2004) (describing “water wars” in Bolivia following privatization of water 
system in Cochabamba); Erik J. Woodhouse, Comment, The “Guerra del Agua” and the 
Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure, 39 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003). 
 32. Joseph Kahn, China Pledges to Lift Wealth of Its Peasants, INT’L HERALD TRIB. Feb. 3, 
2005, at 1 (describing debates over the possibility of increasing peasant land rights). 
 33. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 43 (1994) (describing the legislative background of the Statute of Anne); Adam 
Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550–1800, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259–64 (2001) (tracing history of British “patent” from royal grant of 
monopoly to protection for inventors). 
 34. See, e.g., Susan Teifenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former 
Soviet Union and Its Effect upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(1998) (arguing that the failure of governments like China and the former Soviet Union to control 
intellectual piracy has cost the United States between $20 and $40 billion in revenue). 
 35. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property 
Standards, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2248–50 (2000) (describing a campaign by drug companies 
to get stronger international IP protections for a variety of western products and resistance from 
less-developed countries). 
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Although this Article will focus on IP as the primary example of 
privatization through governmental enablement, there are other property rights 
that have also depended almost wholly on governmental action.  Tradeable 
environmental allowances (TEAs) are another example.  Although TEAs are 
newer, less well-developed, and more experimental than IP rights, they are 
certainly much-discussed as a means to control pollution and resource 
depletion.36  Among the better-known TEA regimes are the United States’ 
program for tradeable emission rights in the gases that form acid rain and the 
European Union’s more recent proposals to use tradeable rights to control 
carbon dioxide emissions.37  These too are property rights that owe their 
existence to enabling governmental legislation, generally passed quite overtly 
to promote ends that would otherwise be served by more direct command 
regulation. 
III.  CONTROVERSY, ECONOMY, POLITICS 
All of the above types of privatization have proved to be controversial and 
disruptive in some locations and circumstances.  Converting informal titles to 
formal ones, for example, can encourage squatters to try to displace existing 
private owners, leading to the kinds of conflicts that sometimes break out in 
rural Brazil.38  In the more common case, where squatters settle on public lands 
rather than private ones, the relevant public spaces may be environmentally 
sensitive or dangerous to the squatters themselves, for example areas subject to 
flooding or mudslides.39  Deregulation of the workplace can disrupt existing 
labor relations, just as housing deregulation can upend landlord–tenant 
relations; meanwhile, the loosening of environmental regulations can leave the 
air, water, and flora and fauna unprotected and vulnerable to degradation.  
Divestiture of formerly state-run enterprises threatens the jobs of employees in 
formerly governmentally operated enterprises, and it alarms consumers about 
the private takeover of what seem to be governmental functions.40  Enablement 
 
 36. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 
276 (2000) (describing literature on market and trade-based environmental programs); Carol M. 
Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable 
Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 45, 51–56 (1999). 
 37. Rose, supra note 36, at 54–55. 
 38. See Kristen Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A New Approach to 
Address an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 557, 570–71 (2003) (describing 
legitimization of squatting and the resulting increase in squatting and violence). 
 39. Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 433, 441 (2003). 
 40. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Market Place: Two Companies Hope Going Public Will Solve 
Their Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C9 (describing union resistance to privatization of 
state-owned French electric service). 
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laws, through which governments create property rights in otherwise unowned 
resources, raise moral issues about the extent to which private individuals 
should be able to own nature or ideas and profit from them—particularly when, 
as in the case of pharmaceutical products, the protection of “enabled” property 
rights seems to come at the cost of sick persons’ health.41 
Given the controversial nature of these various forms of privatization, it is 
important to ask about their purposes.  What are governments attempting to 
accomplish through privatization?  Why is private decision-making, made by 
property owners, thought to be preferable to governmental management, where 
decisions are made by public servants? 
The chief answer to these questions, of course, is an economic one.  
During the Cold War, many thought that central planning would prove to be 
economically superior to private property and free contract—that is to say, 
capitalism.  “We will bury you,” Nikita Khrushchev notoriously warned the 
West.42  But in the end, it was central planning that was buried, unable to 
compete with the variety, innovation, and nimbleness of market forces.43 
Economic thinkers have long had an explanation: private property creates 
the right incentives for creating value.44  The owner gets the rewards if she 
plans carefully, works hard, and pays attention to useful innovation; and she 
takes the punishment if things do not work well because of her carelessness 
and laziness.  Those rewards and punishments are powerful motivations to 
industry, initiative, and attentive planning.  Moreover, property rights identify 
who has what, and thus they encourage people to negotiate trades instead of 
wasting time on quarrelling and jockeying for position.  In turn, the ability to 
buy and sell greatly enhances the value of everyone’s property.  Free 
alienability means that an individual owner can specialize in, say, shoemaking, 
because she can buy her foodstuffs from others who are specializing in raising 
food.  Since the shoemaker can now sell her shoes to a whole array of people 
who want them, her shoemaking talent and tools become all the more valuable.  
The same can be said of the farmer who can specialize in raising particular 
crops. 
These crude examples carry through to the enormously sophisticated 
creations of a modern economy.  Take for example intellectual property, a 
 
 41. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Death by Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, 
at A15 (attributing AIDS deaths to the United States’ insistence on patent protection). 
 42. In an interesting later development, Khrushchev’s son Sergei took American citizenship 
and used the occasion to explain that his father only meant the famous phrase in an economic 
sense.  Francis X. Clines, A Khrushchev Is Pledging New Allegiance, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, 
at A1. 
 43. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 997, 1035 (1998) (“The West won the Cold War not by military success but by ideas.”). 
 44. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 110 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931), for 
the classic statement of this principle. 
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highly complex form of property: Although some commentators disagree,45 
one major theory of intellectual property is squarely based on the same kind of 
rationale: that is, when we allocate property rights to the person who creates 
expressions or inventions, he or she is encouraged to produce all the more 
expressive works and inventiveness.46  Conversely, on this theory, treating 
inventions and expressions as free for the taking would much diminish the 
artist’s or inventor’s willingness to put time and thought into these products. If 
for some reason they did create anyway, they would hoard their secrets rather 
than disseminating them through trade.  Thus whether the issue is building a 
fence around the family farm or going through the steps to get a biotech patent, 
property rights taken together with freedom of contract—the basic building 
blocks of free enterprise—are thought to make everyone better off, because 
they encourage labor and innovation, permit specialization, and encourage the 
free movement of goods and services to those persons who most value them. 
These are old arguments, going back to the eighteenth century and 
before.47  It is of course also widely known that capitalism is subject to what 
are called “market failures,” where property and contract require some 
constraints.48  But even given that caveat, the basic lesson of these arguments 
has much influenced today’s thinking about economic development, including 
the push for privatization made by international trade and finance institutions.49 
But those are not the only arguments for privatization.  Quite aside from 
these well-known economic arguments, there are additional political 
arguments for private property—arguments that are also long-standing, and 
that were developed more or less contemporaneously with the classical 
Enlightenment case for private property as an economic matter.  Putting it 
succinctly, the classical political brief for property stated that private property 
supports democracy and liberty.  As one eighteenth century American 
Revolutionary leader put it, “[P]roperty is the guardian of every other right.”50  
 
 45. See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case 
Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE  L. REV. 601, 603 (2003). 
 46. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (describing theory of patents and 
copyrights as the encouragement of individual inventiveness). 
 47. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, ‘Enough, and as Good’ of What?, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 419–
30 (1987) (describing views of John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Adam Smith on the social 
utility of property and trade). 
 48. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 
317, 354 (explaining that “market failures,” or situations where the market fails to meet 
expectations, are a requisite condition for unconscionable contracts). 
 49. See, e.g., W. Graeme Donovan, Investing in Rural Development, in AGRICULTURAL 
INTENSIFICATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 47, 56 (Steven A. Breth ed., 1998). 
 50. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (2d ed. 1998) (quoting ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE 
JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH 
AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775)). 
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That is to say, not only is property ownership an important political right, but it 
is the most important of all. 
This assertion may seem strange in a modern context, where so many 
people would be likely to select free speech as the critical political right, the 
one right that guards all others.51  But if one listens more closely, one hears 
many echoes of this thought about property even now, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, and indeed those echoes may be getting louder.52  This is 
a subject on which I have written in the past,53 but the modern controversies 
over privatization present an opportunity to revisit some of the classic political 
arguments that property (along with contract) are the central rights, the critical 
core, of what we would broadly see as democratic liberty, such that the 
establishment of property and trade form the ground floor for the development 
and flourishing of democratic institutions.  How do these classic arguments 
map onto the modern contours of privatization? 
IV.  PRIVATIZATION AND THE CASE FOR PROPERTY’S POLITICAL CENTRALITY 
The privatization efforts of the past decades certainly seem to focus on 
converting public management to private property.  How do these efforts 
reflect on the array of political arguments about property’s centrality to liberty 
and democracy?  In the pages that follow, I will go through some of the 
arguments for property’s centrality, to look for the light that the new 
privatization casts on these arguments. 
A. The Priority Argument: Property Is the Central Right Because Property 
Alone Predates, and Justifies, Government 
Here the classic treatment is John Locke’s, who famously argued that 
individuals acquired property before governments were formed, and that when 
they eventually formed governments, they did so in order to secure their 
property.54  Governmental intrusions on property, in this view, undermine the 
very purposes for which government is formed.55  Thus human property-
formation not only predates government but gives people the normative 
leverage to critique government: government is only legitimate if it protects 
people’s property. 
 
 51. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The safeguarding of these 
rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods 
may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free 
government.”). 
 52. See, e.g., O. Lee Reed, What is Property?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 476–77 (2004) 
(arguing that constitutional rights emanate from property rights). 
 53. See Keystone Right, supra note 11. 
 54. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 315–17 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1960) (1690). 
 55. Id. at 378. 
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A more modern development of this line of argument comes from a very 
interesting school of political scientists who have specialized in the study of 
small-scale common property regimes.  A leader in this group is Professor 
Elinor Ostrom of Indiana University, who has described and analyzed 
communities all over the world, communities in which local people have 
created institutions for managing irrigation systems, fisheries, grazing fields, 
and other activities undertaken in common.56  Ostrom and her colleagues argue 
that many of these self-created common property regimes have sprung up and 
lasted for long periods of time—some for centuries on end—without 
governmental support.57  Indeed, she argues that all too often governments 
unjustly and unwisely disrupt these community institutions, as for example 
when corrupt or thoughtless bureaucrats in a central government allow their 
friends to invade a community’s distribution of fishing rights among the local 
residents.58  The lesson from Locke to Ostrom seems to be that people can 
form property regimes without government; that government’s role, if any, is 
to assist in property formation; and that overly intrusive governments 
effectively undermine the natural and sustainable economic activity of human 
beings.  Following Ostrom, what some scholars would like to see would be 
governmental protection of the fishery—or the grazing area or irrigation 
system—as a common property resource for the relevant community; 
privatization in that sense would be entirely appropriate.59 
At least one of the new privatization categories, however, casts a 
somewhat different light on this set of arguments about the relationship of 
property to government.  That is the “recognition” category, notably the efforts 
to clarify, simplify, and formalize previously informal or unclear titles.  Formal 
title is not important in the genre of older communities that Ostrom and her 
colleagues have generally studied, because everyone in the community 
understands the informal distribution of entitlements.60  For example, in one 
Swiss village, the most important property right consists of access to the 
 
 56. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61–65 (1990) (describing the communal tenure system 
that has developed in a centuries-old Swiss village). 
 57. Id. at 58. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 154–57 (explaining how central governmental intrusion into fishery 
weakens local self-management of fishery); Evelyn Pinkerton, Intercepting the State: Dramatic 
Processes in the Assertion of Local Comanagement Rights, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS 
344, 358–63 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (citing examples of central 
governmental policies that encouraged local overfishing). 
 59. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and 
the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 405–06 (1999). 
 60. See OSTROM, supra note 56, at 88–91 (describing normative behavior that has developed 
in ancient communities to control use and transfer of property). 
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meadows where a resident can graze his livestock.61  But such grazing access 
rights belong only to village citizens, and only members of very longstanding 
resident families can be citizens.62  These are communities that my colleague 
Robert Ellickson describes as “close-knit”:63 the residents all know one 
another, and they are intimately aware of who has what property claims.64  If 
there are transfers of property, everyone knows about that, too.  These transfers 
can be made without written documents and formal recording, and the gestures 
of transfer may be witnessed and understood only by local people—the 
handshake, the transfer of a clod of dirt or a set of keys.65  More modern 
squatter communities too depend on enforcement of their informal claims 
through barrio insiders, e.g., the community “bosses” in Ecuador who accept 
payment for protecting residents’ informal claims.66 
By contrast, the clarification of formal title is useful precisely because it 
makes the status of property knowable to outsiders, that is, to strangers to the 
community.  Formal title, managed through central record offices, makes it 
possible for the owner to borrow from a bank on the security of the property.  
A lending bank also formally records its own secured interest, and this means 
that if the borrower fails to repay, the lending bank—perhaps in some distant 
city—may become the title owner of the property.  Indeed, formal title gives 
assurances to any stranger at all who may want to purchase the property.  Thus 
formal title potentially introduces strangers into the community, through a 
form of property assurance that is not at all “natural” to a close-knit 
community. 
Formal title, in short, is an assurance of property that does not predate the 
state.  Formal title is a creature of the state, and if anything it tends to dissolve 
the small-scale communities in which property can be created by “nature.”  As 
an economic matter, formal property rights are effectively available to a global 
economy, not simply to a local one; thus formal title opens up these small 
communities to a whole world of potential buyers.  This opening-up process 
may or may not happen, and local residents may or may not see it as a good 
thing.  But as a political matter, this particular “recognizing” mode of 
 
 61. See ROBERT MCC. NETTING, BALANCING ON AN ALP: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY IN A SWISS MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 78 (1981). 
 62. Id. 
 63. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
177–78 (1991). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”: Communication and Legal Expression 
in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 911–19 (1992) (describing the variety of gestures 
in different cultures signifying contractual obligation, including land transfer). 
 66. Jean O. Lanjouw & Phillip Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property 
Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 992–93 (2002). 
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privatization can scarcely be justified on the classic ground that it simply 
reinforces a form of pre-existing property that is somehow natural to humans. 
Formal title, and the economic benefits it brings, introduces property rights 
that potentially engage much wider populations than any that exist in a 
Lockean (or Ostromian) state of nature.  Property rights of this sort, rights that 
hold between strangers, cannot easily exist without the political organization of 
state agencies.67  Thus “privatization” of this sort assumes the active 
participation of government.68  That fact alone sharply detracts from the easy 
assumption that privatization supports democratic government because 
privatization protects “natural” pre-existing property rights.  This is not the 
case.  Formal title, like IP rights, gives rise to a form of property that would not 
exist at all without governments.69  Whatever relationship this kind of 
privatization may have to democratic governance—and it could be a strong 
one—it is distinctly not about governmental recognition of some kind of 
natural property right.  Quite the contrary, the property protected by formal 
title tends to erode the kinds of “natural,” community-based property rights 
that can predate government. 
Parenthetically, recognition programs are among the most attractive forms 
of privatization; formal titling concentrates on furthering the economic 
advancement of people who otherwise have very limited prospects.70  But 
because formal titling programs potentially open a community to strangers, 
they give a frisson of the kinds of larger-scale problems generally associated 
with the term “anti-globalization.”  When outsiders can freely enter a local 
economy, they may bring needed capital, but only at a cost: the loss of a sense 
of local or national control.71  This is of course one of the reasons why 
globalization can be so very disturbing to some local populations.72  Just as 
formal title puts a barrio house into play in an economy that is much larger 
 
 67. See Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit 
Framework for Titling Programs, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 889, 896–97 (2004) (providing 
general description of formal titling programs and stating that “[registration with the state] helps 
avoid overlapping claims and when done well can give confidence to potential buyers or lenders 
as to who actually owns a piece of land”). 
 68. See generally id. 
 69. See, e.g., J. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 
22 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 941 (1993) (asserting that the “insecurity in negotiated transfers” in 
Nicaragua is due in part to poor state-run title registries). 
 70. Cf. Pooja Mehta, Comment, Internally Displaced Persons and the Sardar Sarovar 
Project: A Case for Rehabilitative Reform in Rural India, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 613, 638 
(2005) (noting that holding formal title is a means for Indian tribal populations to gain access to 
remedies allowed under Indian law). 
 71. See, e.g., Nsongura J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 293, 301 (2002) (describing the 
argument that globalization has had a debilitating effect on African political systems). 
 72. See id. 
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than the local community, so do other forms of privatization put a country’s 
natural resources or banks or telecommunications systems at play in an even 
larger international economy.  At times, this can be a deeply unpopular feature 
of privatization, and even a ground for civic unrest that shakes democratic 
institutions.73 
B. The Power-Spreading Argument: Property is a Central Right Because It 
Diffuses Political Power 
Perhaps the best-known proponent of this view is Milton Friedman, a 
libertarian economist who began to espouse his views in the 1950s and 
1960s.74  Friedman very much opposed socialism on political grounds as well 
as economic ones, arguing that socialist states had only a single source of 
power.75  Because the socialist state could control jobs, education, and indeed 
advancement on any front, Friedman argued, the socialist state could repress 
dissent easily.76  Capitalism and private property, on the other hand, offer 
multiple sources of power, taking the forms of income, prestige, and assets.77  
Thus on Friedman’s argument, states that permit private property and free 
enterprise also foster the proliferation of multiple power sources and, 
ultimately, diverse political views and movements.78 
Interestingly enough, there is an older version of this argument that 
appeared during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when the political 
figures most interested in “privatization” were actually the so-called 
“enlightened despots,” figures like Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine the Great 
of Russia, and Joseph II of Austria.79  These monarchs hoped to foster 
commerce for both economic and political reasons: economic, in that they 
hoped that commerce would bring more wealth and thus tax revenue to their 
treasuries; and political, in that they hoped that the “deregulation” of 
aristocratic and guild monopoly privileges would undermine some of their 
most entrenched opponents.80  Then, as now, deregulation caused anxiety and 
fierce opposition among the holders of the numerous exclusive privileges.81  
 
 73. See, e.g., COX & MASON, supra note 30, at 79 (describing popular objection to loss of 
control from privatization and foreign investment in early post-Communist Eastern Europe); Juan 
Forero, Free Trade Proposal Splits Bolivian City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at C1 (describing 
protests, violence, and instability over planned trading agreement with United States to export 
Bolivian natural gas). 
 74. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
 75. Id. at 15–16. 
 76. Id. at 16–17. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 9–10. 
 79. See JOHN G. GAGLIARDO, ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM 21–22 (1967). 
 80. See id. at 28–36 (describing the economic policies of the “enlightened monarchs” of 
Europe). 
 81. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 43–44. 
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Town guilds in Germany, for example, very much opposed royal charters for 
manufacturers to open factories in the countryside outside the guilds’ legal 
control.82  But James Steuart, a writer associated with the Scottish 
Enlightenment, asserted that even though monarchs were chiefly concerned 
with enlarging their tax revenues when they undermined the older privileged 
classes and fostered free commerce, in taking such measures they would 
engender a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs, and these newcomers would 
demand greater liberty and limitations on arbitrary rule.83  Hence, economic 
liberalization would bring about political reform—whether monarchs liked it 
or not. 
How does the power-spreading argument map onto modern privatization 
measures?  Clearly this argument does have some resonance, particularly with 
respect to the divestiture of state enterprises in favor of private control.  
Consider China: as China increasingly shifts formerly state-run operations to 
private enterprise, Western democracies continue to echo the hope that Steuart 
expressed over 200 years ago: that freer markets make citizens more rights-
conscious and ultimately force rulers to open up more breathing room to 
democratic processes.84  Indeed, in some measure, this has happened.  The 
Chinese press is not bold by Western standards, but it still is bolder than it was 
a few years ago, and as property has spread among the citizens, small-scale 
 
 82. See MACK WALKER, GERMAN HOME TOWNS: COMMUNITY, STATE, AND GENERAL 
ESTATE 1648–1871, at 120–22, 125–26 (1971) (describing guild conflicts with non-guild large 
merchants, arguing that royal officials favored the latter). 
 83. 1 SIR JAMES STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OECONOMY 
216 (Andrew S. Skinner ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1966) (1767). 
 84. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, President Nominates Rob Portman as United 
States Trade Representative (Mar. 17, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 4151089 (describing 
Portman as a negotiator of the free trade agreement with China and Portman’s belief that 
“[t]hrough expanded trade, the roots of democracy and freedom are deepened”).  For a more 
systematic presentation, see Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and 
Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 467–68, 480–81 (2004) (describing the view 
of author Randall Peerenboom that Chinese economic development makes citizens demand more 
rights and describing economic development as generating alternative power sources); Erich 
Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization, 9 INDEP. REV. 165 (2004) 
(developing the theme that prosperity promotes democracy, and both lead to peace, using China 
as an example of a country where greater prosperity brings about more attention to rights and 
ultimately less bellicosity); Anthony Kuhn, China’s Newly Rich are Getting Political, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 17, 2004, at A14 (describing increasing political activity of new Chinese entrepreneurs); 
see also STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 163–64 (attributing to Andrei Shleifer, and sharply criticizing, 
the view that privatization would lead to a demand for political institutions to reform economy); 
cf. Ellen Bork, Asian Blues: Why the Problem of China Will Not Go Away, WKLY. STANDARD, 
July 19, 2004, at 34 (criticizing what the author describes as the decades-long “driving idea” that 
democracy in China will follow from economic engagement). 
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grassroots protests have emerged in a way unthinkable only a decade ago.85  
As yet, of course, this is a transformation still in the making, and China 
certainly is not yet a case study for the diffusion of political power in the wake 
of marketization. 
In addition, other modern “divestitures” give some reason for caution.  The 
experience of the former Soviet Union suggests that the divestiture of former 
state-run enterprises may diffuse power, but that this diffusion might not 
spread very far.  Major economic sectors like energy and banking soon became 
concentrated into the hands of a favored few.86  Indeed, the popular backlash 
against the Yeltsin-era “oligarchs” appears to have strengthened the hands of 
President Putin in re-centralizing governmental control over the press and the 
electoral machinery.87 
One type of privatization-by-divestiture may present particular problems as 
a route to the diffusion of political power: the divestiture and transfer of some 
former public utilities, enterprises that have been called “natural 
monopolies.”88  These types of enterprises generally have infrastructure or 
other startup costs that are so high that there effectively is only room for one 
participant.  For example, once the electric lines are up, there may not be 
enough demand for electricity to support a second set of lines.  This 
discrepancy gives the first mover a great advantage.  If threatened with 
competition, the first mover can lower rates to marginal cost until the rival is 
 
 85. See BRUCE GILLEY, CHINA’S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 72–74 (2004) (describing Chinese 
press’s greater boldness); Jonathan Kaufman, New Crop of Protesters in Tiananmen Square: 
Restive Homeowners, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2004, at A1 (describing new homeowners’ 
organization and protests). 
 86. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A 
Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 218–20 (2003) (describing the acquisition by 
“oligarchs” of major economic sectors, including natural resources, which resulted in 
undermining support for democratic and economic reforms).  See generally DAVID E. HOFFMAN, 
THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW RUSSIA (2002) (providing biographical 
information, including a description of the rise of “oligarchs”).  Interestingly enough, the 
divestitures of British nationalized enterprises in the 1980s showed some of the same “giveaway” 
characteristics.  See VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 180–81, 183–85 (describing sharply 
uneven payoffs from the sale of enterprises); see also COX & MASON, supra note 30, at 131–33, 
201 (describing a greater gap between the rich and poor in poverty in post-Soviet era Eastern 
Europe, along with the potential for social unrest). 
 87. Book Notes, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 179, 188 (2004) (describing Putin’s suppression of the 
“oligarchs”); Stefan Wagstyl & Arkady Ostrovsky, Power to Putin: But is Russia’s Leader Too 
Authoritarian for His Own Good?, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 2004, at 17 (describing 
Russian populace as “revel[ing]” in Putin’s prosecution of oligarchs). 
 88. See Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, in 1 PUBLICATIONS 
AM. ECON. ASS’N., 465 (1887), reprinted in TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS 59, 80 
(Joseph Dorfman ed., 1969) (explaining the theory of “natural monopoly”); see also WILLIAM W. 
SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 12–20 (1982) (describing the history of 
economic thinking about natural monopoly). 
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driven out of business.  These “natural monopolies” typically exist in power 
delivery, transportation facilities, water and sewer lines, and to some (now 
diminishing) degree, telecommunications.89  Nineteenth century economic 
theory treated as a matter of indifference whether such “natural monopolies” 
were state-run (as with the German railroads), or privately run (as with the 
U.S. railroads), so long as the latter operated under state regulatory supervision 
to avoid monopolistic prices and practices.90  In an interesting example, for 
well over a century, New York City shifted its water supply system back and 
forth between private and public ownership, beginning with a private company 
in the late 1700s, then shifting to public control in the 1830s, then trying a 
private firm again in the early twentieth century, before putting the system 
firmly in the city’s hands thereafter.91 
In emerging economies, both private and public management often have 
difficulty raising the capital needed for major improvements in these major 
public works.  Thus as was the case with New York City’s water supply, 
public officials may transfer control to private management in the hope that a 
private enterprise can raise more initial capital.  They may hope as well that 
private management will be more efficient and innovative than bureaucracy, 
and that private managers can more easily charge consumers to cover the costs 
of modernizing infrastructure.  In some cases, some or all of these hopes for 
improvement can be realized, particularly since public management of utilities 
can grow slack—bureaucratized, rudderless, ridden with political meddling, 
and generally underperforming.92 
But private management has problems too—notably, that a “natural 
monopoly” in private hands, unless adequately monitored and regulated, is in 
principle constrained neither by political accountability nor by economic 
competition.93  It is this apparent gap in control that sometimes makes public 
utilities problematic as candidates for divestiture, not only because of the 
economic effects of privatization, but also because of the political 
 
 89. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An 
American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1273–75 (1984) (describing the 
characteristics and various types of natural monopoly); cf. Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, The Impact 
of Privatization and Competition in the Telecommunications Sector Around the World, 47 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 400 (2004) (arguing that technological advances have reduced the natural monopoly 
characteristics of telecommunications). 
 90. See Adams, supra note 88, at 71, 111. 
 91. GERARD T. KOEPPEL, WATER FOR GOTHAM: A HISTORY 68, 140–41, 165, 289 (2000). 
 92. See, e.g., VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 130–34, 143–50 (describing 
weaknesses of British nationalized enterprises). 
 93. See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 56 (criticizing the privatization of utilities prior to the 
development of effective regulatory structures); VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 428–29 
(concluding that British divestiture was short-sighted in the case of some aspects of utilities and 
describing other enterprises with natural monopoly characteristics); Li & Xu, supra note 89, at 
400 (noting the importance of competition in successful privatization). 
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consequences.  In particular, privatization of public utilities in some instances 
defies the political argument that private control diffuses power.  Instead of 
spreading power outward, these privatizations of “natural monopolies” would 
appear to place great power in private hands (and indeed, sometimes, foreign 
hands) that is unconstrained either by private competition or by public 
oversight.  Citizen outrage at this kind of apparent aggrandizement can be 
tremendously disruptive politically, as in the electricity crisis in California a 
few years ago,94 or in the water supply crisis in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 1999–
2000.95 
In fact, however, all of these privatizations of “natural monopolies” have 
involved very complex relationships between government and private 
entities.96  While private suppliers have sometimes seemed to grasp too much, 
it also seems clear that they themselves have sometimes been saddled with 
unrealistic burdens and expectations, and that they sometimes have to operate 
in a climate of crosscutting political motivations.  In Cochabamba, for 
example, there were apparently many flaws and mistakes created by the newly 
created foreign-dominated private water supply consortium, but it was local 
politicians who insisted that the project cover an expensive new dam.97  In part 
to cover this expense, the consortium raised consumers’ water rates 
dramatically.98  In turn, the rate hikes led to an outburst of popular opposition 
and violence that ultimately defeated the entire project and indeed threatened 
Bolivian political stability.99 
However the blame is allocated in that case, popular fears are very real that 
privatization of these enterprises can lead not to the diffusion of power, but 
rather to the aggrandizement of monopoly power in private hands, and to the 
victimization of ordinary people.  This is not to say that all such charges are 
true.  A 2003 empirical study of privatization in Latin America found that, in 
fact, privatized firms generally are more efficient than their state-managed 
predecessors, and that they generally offer better services to all social levels.100  
 
 94. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Golden State: Davis Recall Effort a Case of Casting Stones, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at C1 (listing energy crisis as first among reasons, though unjustified, 
for the recall campaign against then-Governor Grey Davis). 
 95. Woodhouse, supra note 31; William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 
2002, at 43. 
 96. For the range of issues in such enterprises, see Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. 
Trebilcock, Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next 
Privatization Frontier, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 375 (1996). 
 97. See Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 311–14. 
 98. Id. at 315–16. 
 99. Id. at 305–306, 313, 327–28; Finnegan, supra note 95, at 43. 
 100. FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES & ALBERTO CHONG, YALE INT’L CTR. FOR FIN., THE 
TRUTH ABOUT PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 4 (2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstsract=464460; cf. Li & Xu, supra note 89, at 426–27 (discussing a study of 
telecommunications privatization and concluding that privatization generally enhanced 
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This study also found that the failed privatizations are most often attributable 
to political interference, to corruption and lack of transparency, and in the case 
of “natural monopolies,” to weak governmental capacity to provide the 
necessary post-privatization regulatory structure.101 
But there is an important political lesson to be learned from these failures.  
They show that the full weight of political reform cannot be borne by 
privatization alone, contrary to the suggestion of such Enlightenment thinkers 
as Steuart.  Instead, success or failure, both economic and political, may 
depend on the underlying condition of political institutions.  Undoubtedly, 
privatization often can help to reform politics insofar as newly minted private 
sources of income make people less frightened of government, and insofar as 
people engaged in trade and commerce are likely to demand access to 
information, along with some say in predictably enforced laws.  But 
privatization itself often depends to a greater or lesser degree on existing 
political institutions, and insofar as this is true, politicians still may treat newly 
privatized enterprises as a splendid new cash cow.  In turn, the “cow” may face 
opprobrium for its association with politicians’ pet projects, undermining 
confidence in privatization itself.  All this suggests that political reform needs 
to be approached on broader fronts and in a more direct manner, particularly 
by attending to such matters as competent courts and regulatory institutions, 
honest elections, and a free press. 
C. The Distraction Argument: Private Property and Commerce Can Make 
Politics Seem Dull and Boring 
The Distraction Argument is a conception that may have influenced some 
of the United States’ founders, particularly given their consciousness of the 
religious wars that had racked Europe in the previous centuries.  The idea 
behind the Distraction Argument is that if property can be made secure and 
trade made easy, citizens are likely to become more interested in making 
money, and correspondingly less interested in killing one another for religious 
or clan-related or nationalistic reasons.  For these reasons, private property and 
active commerce should make politics as a whole less heated and less 
deadly.102  Boring politics are better than overheated and over-exciting politics, 
according to this view, and the encouragement of commerce is one way to 
make politics boring.  Thus, low voter turnout may not be taken as a problem, 
but rather as a sign that people have better things to do with their time—
 
performance and competition, but that certain groups, such as previously subsidized pensioners 
and laid-off employees, may not have shared in the gains). 
 101. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES & CHONG, supra note 100, at 4. 
 102. Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 631, 648–49 
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., Rand McNally & Co. 2d ed. 1972). 
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namely, getting rich.103  If they can busy themselves getting rich, they will stop 
shooting at one other.  The same idea seems to have animated some members 
of George W. Bush’s administration in their hopes for a new Iraq, though the 
violence in that country to date has sharply undercut the possibilities for 
commerce.104 
How do modern ideas about privatization reflect on this political hope for 
private property and commerce?  The pattern seems to be somewhat mixed.  At 
least in some of the divestiture cases mentioned above, the privatization of 
major utilities has not at all defused politics but rather inflamed them, as in 
Bolivia, where the attempted privatization of Cochabamba’s water supply set 
off a train of events that united very disparate groups of citizens in violent 
opposition to the new supply contract.105  More generally, Amy Chua argues 
that globalization, which often overlaps with privatization, can set off ethnic 
violence aimed particularly at market-dominant minority groups such as the 
Chinese in Indonesia.106  Less violent political fights over the deregulation of 
rent control periodically turn up the heat even in New York politics.107 
On the other hand, not all deregulations and divestitures have had this 
disruptive effect.  The privatization of the water systems in some cities in Chile 
appears to have worked well without political backlash, perhaps in part 
because the Chileans created a system for subsidizing poor families’ water bills 
through the social security system.108  This may not accord with the standard 
understanding of prices and economic incentives, but it undoubtedly relieved 
public opposition.  Subsidies are not a complete answer for every situation, 
though, because the Cochabamba project aroused fierce opposition even 
though it, too, contemplated somewhat lower rates for lower-income 
 
 103. See for example Richard A. Posner, Smooth Sailing, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 41–
42, for Judge Posner’s acid comments on Bruce Ackerman’s and James Fishkin’s idea to have a 
“deliberation day” to discuss issues at stake in elections (arguing that competition informs voters 
about candidates, just as it does about toasters; that voter apathy can express rational preference; 
and that an additional “deliberation day” would take time that citizens would rather spend on 
other matters such as family or business). 
 104. Jay Solomon et al., As Growth Returns to Pakistan, Hopes Rise on Terror Front, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at A1 (describing the hope that economic improvement would overcome 
terrorism). 
 105. Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 327–28; Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limits 
of Water Regulation: The Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. LATIN 
AM. RES. 99, 108–11 (2002). 
 106. CHUA, supra note 8, at 7. 
 107. See Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World As We Know It (and I Feel Fine): 
Rent Regulation in New York City and the Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV., 1125, 1125–26 (2004) (describing political turmoil surrounding New York’s 
rent regulation). 
 108. JAMES WINPENNY, WORLD WATER COUNCIL, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 19 (2003), 
http://www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/FinPanRep.MainRep.pdf; BARLOW & CLARKE, supra 
note 5, at 217. 
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households.109  India, which has deregulated many aspects of its economy in 
the last few years and has enjoyed a striking economic boom, may be a test 
case for the theory that commerce can take the heat out of politics.110  
Interestingly enough, the strident and confrontational Hindu nationalist party, 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was the chief sponsor of India’s deregulation, 
and presumably it was destined to become the chief political beneficiary of 
economic good fortune.111  Instead, it was the more inclusive Congress Party 
and its allies that raised issues about privatization and that surprisingly 
defeated the BJP at the polls in 2004, in large part due to the dissatisfaction of 
rural citizens who thought that they were left out of the good times.112  All the 
same, the Congress Party also seems unlikely to take a major turn away from 
its predecessor’s privatization efforts, recognizing their importance for 
employment and economic prosperity, so in a sense the book is still out on 
whether commerce in India can soften political divisions.113 
Modern privatization measures suggest that a key factor for the Distraction 
Argument concerns what we might call “baselines.”  If a substantial number of 
people have a stake in current governmental regulation or management, and if 
they think that privatization causes them to suffer a substantial drop in the 
current baseline of their well-being (as in the case of tenants who face rent 
deregulation), then privatization will heat up politics rather than calm politics 
down, at least over a short run.  Issues of relative well-being may matter too.  
In the 2004 elections, India’s rural poor reacted angrily at seeing themselves 
bypassed by the newly wealthy urban sectors, but at least they took out their 
resentments in elections.114  Amy Chua recounts much more disastrous 
responses to unevenly distributed gains from privatization, particularly when 
angry majority populations have ousted and devastated the “market-dominant 
minorit[ies]” who had gained the most from free-market policies.115  More 
broadly, the issues of baseline and relative status also suggest that 
distributional issues may have a very pronounced effect on the possibilities for 
privatization.116 
 
 109. Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 318–19; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 105, at 111. 
 110. Amy Waldman, Premier of India Is Forced to Quit After Vote Upset, N.Y. TIMES, May 
14, 2004, at A1. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (describing Hindu nationalist party rule’s privatization policies and economic 
success, and the rural backlash in the election). 
 113. See Amy Waldman, In India, Economic Growth and Democracy Do Mix, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 2004, at 4-3 (describing continuing central commitment to free market reforms, 
including in agriculture, in spite of populist election rhetoric and rural discontent). 
 114. See Waldman, supra note 110. 
 115. CHUA, supra note 8, at 163–75. 
 116. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217–20 (1998) (describing potential 
political backlash from policies that increase total wealth but also increase distributional gap); 
Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (arguing that behavior 
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The interplay between distributional issues and economic change is a 
subject that has much engaged the economist Gary Libecap, who has studied a 
number of proposals to redefine and sharpen property rights.  His view, very 
crudely stated, is that in contemplating reform, people compare their personal 
pre- and post-reform situations; those who had done well under a pre-existing 
but inefficient system must often be mollified or paid off, because otherwise 
they may be able to mount so much opposition to economic reform that the 
reform will never take place.117  Libecap is primarily interested in economic 
reform, but his point is basically a political one: that proposed alterations in a 
system of entitlements can arouse political disturbances that are so great that 
they undermine any economic change.  The Cochabama experience is again an 
example.  The pre-existing water delivery arrangements were fragmented and 
grossly inadequate, but water (when and where it was available) was generally 
relatively cheap.118  The newly privatizing consortium, by contrast, roused 
suspicion among local people—particularly farmers—that they would lose 
their existing water sources, however inefficient and ultimately unsustainable 
those sources were.119  When the consortium began to raise rates sharply to 
cover modernization costs and cover investors’ risks, it only confirmed fears of 
pending loss among already mistrustful local groups, uniting the rural and 
urban opposition and eventually leading to the riots that brought down the 
entire project.120 
Such failed modern privatization efforts should deliver a warning about the 
old hope that private property can defuse political explosions.  The argument 
has a certain circularity, and it only works if the shift to private property itself 
is politically acceptable—or can be made acceptable through greater 
transparency and public discussion, and possibly through distributional 
concessions to calm potential opposition.  Without these essentially political 
moves, privatization may simply inflame politics all the more. 
D. The Symbolic Argument: Property Is the Central Right Because It 
Symbolizes All Other Rights and Thus Educates All in Rights-
Consciousness 
It is often hard for people to think without real-world examples.  Property 
has a particular concreteness that makes it especially attractive as an example 
of rights generally.  This is true in modern scholarship, where torts and 
 
can be motivated strongly by desire for relative status).  See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, 
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985). 
 117. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 5 (1989). 
 118. Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 303–05. 
 119. Id. at 317–21; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 105, at 112. 
 120. Willem Assies, David Versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and 
the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia, LATIN AM. PERSP., May 2003, at 14, 24–30 (2003); 
Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 328–37. 
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contracts scholars often use examples drawn from property to make their 
theoretical points.121  But the use of property examples to illustrate other rights 
is a pattern that goes much further back as well.  James Madison wrote a 
famous public letter describing a whole litany of his rights as property, saying 
that he had a “property” in his reputation, his religious views, and in a whole 
series of other entitlements.122 
Property thus appears to be more available to the imagination than many 
other rights, and if this is so, one might think, the protection of property rights 
is especially important.  Having property rights can make the owner think of 
himself or herself as a rights-holding person more generally; if a person owns a 
tool or a pig or a house, she gets a sense of what it means to have rights.  In 
that sense, holding property is an education in what it means to be a rights-
bearer. 
Now, there are those who disagree with this view, such as Jennifer 
Nedelsky, who thinks that property is a poor symbol for other rights.123  And of 
course, it is quite hard to measure whether anyone really generalizes from 
property ownership to other rights.  But there do seem to be some hints that the 
symbolic argument has some force, Nedelsky’s contrary view notwithstanding.  
Property owners are more likely than tenants to vote and to take part in 
community affairs, for example.124  Certainly people with insecure land tenure 
seem to be anxious to have more firmly fixed property rights, as is the case 
with farmers in China and squatters in urban areas in many less developed 
countries.125  Insofar as property rights give people a sense of security, these 
rights may act as a kind of emotional platform for greater assertiveness on 
other fronts. 
Some modern privatization measures could add to this assertiveness, 
particularly the “recognition” privatizations that make land tenure more 
certain.  Privatization in the form of deregulation probably works both for and 
against the symbolism of secure rights; on the one hand, deregulation could 
add to owners’ sense of security from governmental intrusion, but on the other, 
it could diminish the sense of security of, say, tenants who were previously 
protected by rent control regulations. 
 
 121. See generally Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997). 
 122. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101–03 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
 123. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 262–63 (1990). 
 124. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. AFF. 354, 356 (1999) (stating that homeowners are 
fifteen percent more likely to vote in local elections). 
 125. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Chinese Farmers Rebel Against Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2000, at A1. 
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There is one area of modern privatization that seems to cut fairly sharply 
against the Symbolic Argument, however: that is, the “enabling” privatization 
that protects what are essentially governmentally created property rights, 
notably intellectual property (IP).  The starting point is that most people are not 
holders of significant IP rights.126  Instead, most people perceive themselves as 
obligated by IP rights, since the rights belong to others.  Many IP rights are 
quite counterintuitive.  It is a technical violation of copyright, for example, to 
sing “Happy Birthday to You” in a bar or restaurant without the copyright 
holder’s permission.127  There is even an organization in the United States, 
ASCAP, that makes a practice of ferreting out such public performances of 
copyrighted songs and demanding payment—as it did from the Girl Scouts a 
few years ago, for singing copyrighted songs around the campfire.128  Most 
people have no intuition that they are not supposed to perform such 
copyrighted material, and they resent being told that they are in violation.129  
More seriously, many people feel indignant that because of patent laws, even 
the poor have to pay a monopoly price for pharmaceutical drugs, when the 
drugs themselves can be manufactured so much more cheaply.130 
This is not to say that there are not good economic reasons for enforcing IP 
rights, even in the case of pharmaceuticals.  There are.  Research and 
development of drugs is expensive, and aside from direct public subsidy, the 
only significant way to recoup that expense is to charge a price higher than the 
manufacturing cost for the product itself.131  Without the certainty of this 
recompense, much development and improvement of drugs would undoubtedly 
dry up, and pharmaceutical companies might increasingly turn away from 
medicine to such politically safer products as cosmetics and cures for sexual 
 
 126. Or, if they are technically holders of IP rights, they don’t know it.  For example, many 
people are technically owners of copyrights on writings or artwork, since copyright attaches as 
soon as one “fixes” the writing or work of art, and thus one has a copyright in one’s doodles on a 
page.  But most people are unaware of these rights. 
 127. See, e.g., Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 951, 964–65 (2004) (describing everyday activities that infringe copyright). 
 128. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 56 (2004) (describing Girl Scout episode as 
example of popular backlash when content holders overplay their hand). 
 129. See id.; see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29 (2001) (noting 
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 130. M. Gregg Bloche & Elizabeth R. Jungman, Health Policy and the WTO, 31 J.L. MED. & 
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 131. Theodore C. Bailey, Note, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in 
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202–04 (describing high risks of drug research and development and the need for patent 
protection for incentive). 
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dysfunctions.132  But however compelling those economic arguments may be, 
as a matter of political symbolism, enforcement of IP rights seems not an 
education in rights-bearing, but rather an education in having to bear the 
burden of other people’s rights.  If anything, for most people, the symbolism of 
IP is disempowering: the symbolism of this form of property is all too often 
that the powerful have rights, while the rest of us have only obligations.  
Indeed, this disempowering symbolism maps onto larger global tensions: the 
nations most insistent on IP enforcement are the IP-exporting developed 
countries, whereas less-developed countries have tended to resist. 
The dictatorial edges of IP can be softened.  One method is much like the 
method that Chile used to soften the edges when privatizing some urban water 
systems—that is, by establishing a subsidy for poor families, which in effect 
acts like a two-tier pricing system.133  The controversies over delivering AIDS 
drugs to less-developed countries have generated a great deal of thinking about 
tiered systems of payment and about other ways that IP rights and charges 
might be modified to accommodate overwhelming need.134  A second method 
to soften the edges speaks to a quite different concern, namely to make IP law 
more attentive to the intellectual creativity of non-Western societies.  There are 
many galling stories about Western firms that patent minor variations on 
plants—plants that non-Western cultivators actually developed over long time 
periods—and there are other similar stories about Western firms that record 
folktales and then claim copyright, even against the communities from which 
these tales arose.135  In more recent negotiations on international IP, less-
developed countries have been able to get some national protection for local 
knowledge and cultural productions, for example, for folklore.136  There are 
certain difficulties with this solution, however, since in some countries, 
traditional communities have substantial conflicts with their own national 
governments, so that local communities may not be so happy with national IP 
 
 132. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, No Profit, No Cure, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 46 
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ownership of local creativity.137  More broadly, special protections for 
traditional knowledge subtly undermine the chief theoretical justification for 
any kind of IP, namely the claim that IP incentivizes intellectual creativity.  
Traditional knowledge has already been “out there” for some time, and this 
kind of knowledge would seem to need no further incentive for production.138  
On the other hand, understood as a claim of compensation for contribution, 
some stretching and bending of standard IP categories could mean that in the 
future, IP protections will not so lopsidedly symbolize the power of more 
developed countries against less developed ones.139 
The debate over traditional knowledge is a kind of marker of IP’s symbolic 
significance more broadly—one striking instance among many in a larger 
pattern.  However economically useful it may be, IP is a highly specialized 
kind of property.  Precisely because its beneficiaries constitute a relatively 
narrow set of claimants, IP’s symbolism for most people contradicts the idea 
that property acts as an education in rights-bearing.  Instead, for most, IP is 
simply not personalized or widespread enough to count as a symbol of rights-
bearing.  Moreover, unlike the ownership of consumer goods or even land, it is 
unlikely that IP ever will be very personalized or widespread, because IP is an 
unlikely candidate for broad ownership.  It is not hard to imagine even very 
poor people owning some small space, some tools or domestic animals or 
personal items; but it is hard to imagine those people holding any meaningful 
rights under IP.  All IP will teach such people is that some have rights, while 
most do not. 
With respect to property’s symbolic significance, then, modern 
privatization again presents a mixed picture: some aspects of privatization 
seem to support property’s symbolism of rights, insofar as privatization helps 
many people to claim ownership.  But some other aspects of privatization, 
notably an expanded IP, serve notice that not all property can function well as 
a symbol of what it means to bear rights. 
 
 137. See generally BROWN, supra note 135. 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
718 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:691 
E. The Civilizing Argument: Property and Commerce Are Central Rights 
Because They Educate People in the Patterns of Give-and-Take on Which 
Democracy Depends 
The Civilizing Argument also goes back to the classical eighteenth-century 
thinkers on political economy.  But it rings rather strangely in modern ears, 
accustomed as we are to the Marxist description of the ferocity of capitalist 
exploitation.140 Earlier thinkers like Montesquieu and Hume, however, 
compared commercial practice favorably to the even more ferocious practices 
of aristocratic society, and they argued that commerce “softens” manners.141  
The intuition here is that commercial people cannot afford the pomposity, 
vainglory, and casual violence of aristocrats.  Nor, in a more modern setting, 
can they afford the rudeness that so plagued customer relations in some 
socialist states.  Merchants have to pay attention to the wants and interests of 
others because they have to bargain with others to arrive at a mutually 
satisfactory conclusion.  This is as true of modern commerce as it was in 
earlier times; like it or not, Disney and McDonald’s are exquisitely sensitive to 
the demands of their customers.142  They have to be, or their customers will go 
elsewhere. 
One sees this pattern of attentiveness quite markedly in some of the 
privatizing activity of recent years.  For example, when McDonald’s opened its 
first Moscow restaurant, it had to teach its employees to smile at customers, 
something that caused astonishment among the customers themselves.143  
Similarly, as China began a few years ago to open up some enterprises to a 
freer commerce, the government had to give elaborate instructions to store 
clerks on some things that they should not say to customers, e.g., “Stop 
shouting.  Can’t you see I’m eating?”144 
There is another socializing factor at work in commercial relations as well.  
Much commerce consists of repeat dealings, so that, in their business affairs, 
people try to get to know one another and try to earn the trust of others as 
potential trading partners.  Though the matter is controversial, some historians 
even attribute the rise of philanthropy in the early nineteenth century to the 
expansion of world trade, as merchants learned about very distant peoples and 
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became interested in their well-being.145  These patterns continue; sometimes 
commercial relationships can develop into genuine friendships, friendships that 
would have been inconceivable except through the gateway of initial 
commercial contacts. 
There are undoubtedly untold instances of rudeness, deceit, and self-
dealing in commercial relationships, but we think of these examples over 
against a backdrop of more typical commercial behavior, which on the whole 
is reasonably polite and respectful of the rights of others.  We tend to forget 
that this “normal” behavior is part of a culture of commerce, and we think it is 
simply nature.  But it is not.  It is learned behavior, and commerce helps to 
teach it. 
At the same time, there are cautionary areas in modern privatization.  Once 
again, the divestiture of public utilities is a particularly problematic area for 
any “civilizing” character of privatization.  It is not that privatized utilities’ 
staffs are more rude and autocratic than state-run ones; but they may not be a 
great deal better.  This comes from the “natural monopoly” character of 
utilities, which means that they are relatively undisciplined by competition—
the very force that drives commercial people to be attentive to customers.146  
Even in more developed countries, there are many complaints of rudeness and 
unresponsiveness from the gas company, the electric company, or the local 
telephone company.  They do not have to compete for your business, and as a 
consequence, they may not pay a great deal of attention to your wishes or 
complaints. 
All this is relative, though, and perhaps even the “natural monopolies”—
and even bureaucrats—can learn a modicum of politeness if they are 
surrounded by other more conventional commercial activities.  Democracies 
require some of the same cultural traits that property and commerce do: respect 
for the rights of others, an appeal to voluntary agreement rather than force, the 
channeling of self-interest into cooperation for mutual benefit.  Indeed, when 
we think about it, there are rather few circumstances in which we regularly 
take into account the needs of others and try to cooperate with them and to earn 
their trust.  Those that exist are very intense, of course: friendship, family, and 
love also do this work.  But friendship, family and love do not carry us very far 
from home.  Property and trade, on the other hand, can carry us very far 
indeed, connecting people to others who are strangers to them; consider, for 
example, the numbers of persons whom you must trust to take a trip in an 
airplane.  And although the appeal to cooperation in commerce has a thin 
emotional basis—what used to be called “self-interest rightly understood”—
commerce still generates institutions in which we learn to engage peacefully 
with very distant others, and we learn that we can do well for ourselves by 
 
 145. Keystone Right, supra note 11, at 353–54 (describing thesis and controversies about it). 
 146. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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respecting rights, avoiding violence, and behaving in trustworthy ways.  If 
there is any really important political capital to be gained for democracies from 
privatization, surely this culture of commerce must be part of it. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In all the examples given above, modern privatization efforts suggest a 
mixed picture, a certain muting of the political arguments for property and free 
commerce.  It is not that the old arguments are flatly or even mostly wrong, but 
rather that in some arenas, modern privatization efforts illustrate some weak 
spots in the older political arguments for property.  In fact, many of the modern 
efforts to privatize are themselves state-led, and it would be surprising indeed 
if privatization could turn around and single-handedly reform the political 
culture of the very states that initiated privatization. 
The take-away lesson is that privatization in a modern context is only one 
of a whole array of political reforms, though it is an important one.  
Privatization, for example, can help to increase the demand for governmental 
accountability and competence, but this is in part because private property 
depends on accountable and competent government.  There is certain 
circularity here: property requires that a modicum of governmental competence 
already be in place before property-owners can increase the demand for more 
competence.  That is why democratic reform needs to engage in efforts on 
many different fronts, not just the economic one. 
 
